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that changes have occurred which,
when considered with all other relevant circumstances, required that a
change in custody be made to accommodate the future best interest of the
children" Id. at 1139. The court acknowledged that "[a] determination of
custody requires an element ofprediction" and that it is "neither necessary
nor desirable" to wait until a child is
harmed to make a custody change. Id.
The court also examined the relationship between a master's recommendations and a chancellor's judgement. In particular, the court was
troubled by the chancellor's failure to
exercise independent judgment after
subjecting the master's fact-finding to
a clearly erroneous test. The court
called the burden on chancellors "substantial," and the court emphasized
that while consideration may and
should be given to a master's recommendations, the final decision must be
that of the chancellor's. Id. at 1135,
1138. ''That the conclusions ... ofthe
master are well supported by the evidence is not dispositive ifthe independent exercise ofjudgment by the chancellor on those issues would produce a
different result," explained the court.
Id. at 1135.
The McCready and Domingues
opinions should provide fresh guidance for change-in-custody cases. The
decisions affirmed that the standard for
modification of custody orders is the
''best interests ofthe child." Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
clearly stated that a child need not have
been adversely affected before a chance
in custody can occur. Finally, the
court's emphasis on the chancellor's
duty to exercise independent judgment
forces trial judges to take procedural
steps to avoid the appearance of rubber-stamping the recommendations of
masters.

Murphyv. Edmonds: MARYLAND'S
STATUTORY CAPON NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND NEITHER
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS NOR
DENIES RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL.
In Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d

102 (Md. 1992), the Court of Appeals
of Maryland upheld the State's statutory cap on noneconomic damages in
personal injury cases as constitutional.
Using the least burdensome test in
analyzing the Courts & Judicial Proceedings article, section 11-108 ofthe
Maryland Code, the court found that
the law was rationally related to the
State's purpose and did not violate the
equal protection clause ofthe constitution. The court's ruling also means
that limiting a jury's award with a
noneconomic damages cap does not
violate an individual's constitutional
right to a jury trial. In justifying it's
position, the court proclaimed its deference to the legislature in removing
the issue from the judiciary and enacting the cap with legislation.
Sarah Murphy was involved in an
automobile accident while driving on
1-83 in Baltimore. The defendants' tire
blew out and his truck ran across the
median striking Ms. Murphy, causing
her serious injuries. Ms. Murphy and
her husband filed a complaint in Baltimore County Circuit Court for compensatory and punitive damages. The
jury awarded the Murphys $510,000 in
noneconomic damages. The defendants filed post trial motions requesting that the noneconomic damages be
reduced to the statutory amount of
$350,000 as provided in section 11108.
The plaintiffs, however, argued that
section 11-108 violated the equal protection guarantee embodied in the Due
Process Clause found in article 24 of
- Catherine E. Head the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The trial court ruled that the statute
limited an important right, and therefore, the statute would have to pass the
heightened scrutiny test. Id. at 106.

32 - The Law Foruml22.3

The judge found the statute failed
heightened scrutiny and therefore upheld the jury award.
The court of special appeals reversed the trial court's holding in
Edmonds v. Murphy, 573 A.2d 853
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). There, the
court found that there was no important right which the statute was limiting and, determined that as such, section 11-108 was rationally related to
the State's goal of economic regulation and thus constitutional.
.
The plaintiffs appealed to the court
of appeals on two issues: 1) that the
classification created by section Il108 violated the equal protection guarantee of article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, and 2) that section 11-108 infringes upon the right to
ajurytrial under articles 5and23 ofthe
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
The court began its analysis on the
premise that equal protection as addressed in Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration of
Rights was the same concept for analytical purposes. Opinions of the
United States Supreme Court dealing
with the Equal Protection Clause ofthe
Fourteenth Amendment were therefore viewed by the court of appeals as
''practically direct authorities." Id. at
108 (citing Attorney General v.
Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (1981».
The plaintiffs argued that section
11-108 created two classes of people
when damages were awarded under
this statute. One group, composed of
those who were less seriously injured,
got to keep the entire jury award, while
the other group, those who were more
seriously injured, did not. Such classification, the plaintiffs argued, was in
violation ofthe equal protection guarantee of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.
In addressing the plaintiffs' claim,
the court discussed the three different
standards of review for classifications
chaJlenged under the equal protection
guarantees. The least restrictive standard of review was the rational basis

test, where it would strike down legislation "only if it [was] so unrelated to
legitimate purpose that government
actions were irrational." Id. (quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395,
2406 (1991».
Secondly, the court identified "intermediate scrutiny," or "heightened
scrutiny." For this classification to be
sustained it "must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Id. at 110 (quoting
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976».
The court then recognized the third
category involving cases where a "sus..,
pect class" or a "fundamental right"
was burdened. The court explained
that the classification was subject to
strict scrutiny and it would uphold
such a law "under equal protection
guarantee only if it [was] shown that
'they are suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. ,,, Id. at 109
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985».
The plaintiffs argued that the intermediate scrutiny test should apply because section 11-1 08 limits an "important personal right." Id. at 111. The
plaintiffs asserted that this personal
right arose out of the common law
right to be compensated for
noneconomic damages. The court of
appeals refused to apply the intermediate test on the basis that, in its view, the
right to compensation under common
law does not give rise to an "important
personal right." The court stated, "a
legislative cap of $350,000 upon the
amount of noneconomic damages
which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff
does not implicate such an important
'right' as to trigger any enhanced scrutiny." Id.
The court based its position on article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, which said the common law
was subject "to the revision of and
amendment or repeal by the legislature
of this state." Id. at 112. The court
reasoned that just because a law was
found in the common law does not

mean that the legislature could not
change it. Further, the court emphasized that iftheplaintiffs' position was
adopted, every common law would
become a personal right and applying
the intermediate standard of review
would prevent the legislature from
making many laws. Id.
The court pointed out that its decision followed the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59 (1978), where the Court applied the rational basis test to a legislative cap on tort damages in nuclear
power accidents. In that case, the
Court stated that the law was "'a classic example of an economic regulation' needed to accommodate 'the burdens and benefits of economic life, '"
and further emphasized that '''[a] person has no property, no vested interest,
in any rule of the common law.'" Id.
(quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88).
The court of appeals further stated
that its holding does not limit a person's
access to the courts, as the Murphys
argued. The court reasoned that modifying the substantive law does not restrict access to the courts. Even if
section 11-108 was restrictive, the court
explained, it would be reasonable based
upon the legislative intent of increasing the availability of insurance in
Maryland. Id. at 113-14.
Having decided that the rational
basis test applied in this case, the court
viewed the statute as constitutional.
The court looked to the General
Assembly's reasoning for passing the
legislation. The court noted the
legislature's concern about the availability and cost ofliability insurance in
Maryland, the excessive insurance premiums for doctors, and the declining
services available for patients. The
court noted that the stated purpose of
the law was to "assure the availability
of sufficient liability insurance, at a
reasonable cost, in orderto coverclairns
for personal injuries to members of the
public." Id. at 115. As such, it served
a legitimate state purpose and applied
to all personal injury claimants equally,

ratherthan singling out one category of
claimants. Therefore, the court held
that the noneconomic damages cap was
neither irrational or arbitrary.
The plaintiffs' second argument was
that the cap violated their right to a jury
trial as guaranteed by articles 5 and 23
ofthe Maryland Declaration ofRights.
Their rights, the plaintiffs argued, were
violated because the cap interfered with
the jury's ability to properly determine
damages and also interfered ''with the
jury's exclusive province in determining factual issues." Id. at 116. The
court rejected this argument, stating
that, because it was decided that the
legislature was allowed to cap
noneconomic damages, there was nothing for the judge or the jury to decide.
Id. The right to a jury trial arises in
cases where the result or issue must be
decided by either the judge or the jury.
The court held, however, that the legislature had taken the issue of
noneconomic damages out ofthe hands
of both the judge and jury. ld.
The holding in Murphy settles a
long argument in the legal, legislative
and insurance communities. The Maryland Legislature enacted the
noneconomic damages cap because it
places as a high priority on the availability of insurance to Maryland citizens. The court of appeals has clearly
decided this one issue of whether section 11-108 is constitutional. Yet, it is
foreseeable that more litigation will
follow as future litigants debate issues
regarding whether certain damages are
economic or noneconomic, as well as
to which cases the noneconomic cap
will apply.
- Elizabeth A. Lee

Woodson v. State: HEIGHTENED
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION
REQUIRED TO ADMIT CONFESSIONS WHICH TRIGGER
DEATH SENTENCE ELIGIBILITY.
In Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251,
600 A.2d 420 (1992), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland nullified
petitioner's death sentence by revers-
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